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In this article I examine the main conceptions of public reason in contemporary political 
philosophy (Rawls, Habermas, critical theory) in order to set the frame for appreciating the 
novelty of the pragmatist understanding of public reason as based upon the notion of 
consequences and upon a theory of rationality as inquiry. The approach is inspired by 
Dewey but is free from any concern with history of philosophy. The aim is to propose a 
different understanding of the nature of public reason aimed at overcoming the limitations 
of the existing approaches. Public reason is presented as the proper basis for discussing 





Pragmatism brings to democratic theory as well as in other fields of political 
reflection a new look to classical issues. Among these, of the utmost 
importance for contemporary political debates is its renewed understanding of 
a central notion, that of public reason. Starting from a conception of 
rationality rooted in the primacy of practices, pragmatism redefines the notion 
of public reason in a way that is irreducible to the main contemporary 
approaches to this issue: the liberalist view mostly championed by John Rawls 
and the discursive, communitarian and critical theory approaches. In order to 
single out the specific identity of the pragmatist theory of public reason, I will 
firstly proceed to sketch the profile of its main contemporary competitors. The 
focus of my examination of the concept of public reason in mainly 
epistemological: it is my persuasion that the originality of the pragmatist 
approach to public reason resides precisely in its capacity to propose a fully 
new account of what is human reason, what its place in human affairs and 
what its main epistemological requirements. Some of the traits of this new 
conception of rationality will be sketched below. 
 
1. Public reason and the pragmatist epistemology of practice 
 
The pragmatist epistemology of practice, and the theory of rational inquiry 
that it supports have vast epistemological consequences non only in the 
domain of general philosophy but also in that of political reflection. The notion 
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of inquiry provides the conceptual basis for facing in a new way issues related 
to the relationship of beliefs to individual and collective agency. This is the 
avenue chosen by pragmatism in order to define the notion of public reason 
and to understand its place in public affairs. Through its theory of public 
reason, pragmatism has deeply contributed to a thorough redefinition of the 
political categories of the public and of the private sphere and of our 
understanding of their mutual relationships. Blurring the dualism of the public 
and the private that grounds the liberal approach to public reason, the 
pragmatist account provides a new understanding of the public sphere starting 
from a different theory of rationality. The novelty of the pragmatist approach, 
to this extent, is that its conception of the public sphere and the redefinition of 
the boundaries of the private and the public are strictly connected to the 
epistemological revolution operated by the introduction of the conception of 
belief as a guide for action and by the understanding of rationality according 
to the paradigm of inquiry.  
With reference to mainstream liberal and discursive political philosophy, 
pragmatism operates a double shift: on one side, it resists the understanding of 
the public sphere according to the categories of universality and neutrality; on 
the other side, it rejects the traditional dichotomy of the public and the 
private. Both moves are important in order to provide a fresh interpretation of 
the contemporary dynamical transformations of the public space (Innerarity 
2006, Held 2004), as this last has proven to be reducible to traditional 
conceptions of public reason only at the cost of great losses. Classical 
conceptions of public reason as being neutral and universal are generally 
couched in terms of a model of rationality dominated by the idea of a strong 
and irreducible opposition between the private and the public forms of its use. 
Ideals of universality and neutrality are generally conceived out of the 
persuasion that access to reason requires a process of detachment that frees the 
individual from his specific and personal traits (desires, interests, conceptions, 
etc.). In order to preserve the universality and neutrality that qualify its 
legitimacy, public reason needs therefore to set its operational conditions in 
opposition to the rules that govern its private use.  
We can see this epistemological presupposition at work both in the classical 
liberalist paradigm and in the works of some of its opponents such as 
communitarian and critical theorists: whether such a reason is endorsed as the 
necessary basis of political legitimacy or rejected as a condition of oppression, 
it constitutes nevertheless the undisputed presupposition of the debate. 
Something similar happens with reference to the opposition of the private and 
the public: whether it is posited as the necessary presupposition of the social 
and political constitution or whether it is rejected in favour of a politics of 
identities and recognition, what is at work is the same epistemological 
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framework that sees the public and the private reason as being two statically 
differentiated and irreducible entities1.  
On both these issues, the route taken by pragmatism is radically different. 
Pragmatism offers not only a different account of the nature of the public 
sphere and of the place of rationality inside it, but also a different 
understanding of how the individual dimension (the ‘private’) can enter it in 
ways that while ensuring the necessary expression to the individual voice do 
not compromise its public nature. In a similar way, the pragmatist definition 
of the notion of public sphere via that of consequences and problematic 
situations points towards an understanding of the public dimension as being 
neither neutrally abstracted from individual interests (the public as that which 
is irreducible to individual drives) nor reducible to the sum of individual 
interests: while consequences affect individual lives and functions as individual 
drives, they operate as the forces which support the formation of new publics, 
giving form and meaning to collective action in a way that is not adequately 
explained neither by the individualist paradigm of classical liberalism nor by 
the collectivist paradigm of communitarian efforts at overcoming the 
limitations of the liberalist account. Failure at understanding this point 
determines the wrongful identification of pragmatism with a variant of 
utilitarianism. The political outcome of the process of public inquiry is, in fact, 
a new public which did not existed before.  
Within the pragmatist tradition, it is notably deweyan pragmatism that 
has offered the most relevant contribution to the articulation of this 
constructive understanding of public inquiry as the process through which 
publics are shaped through the identification and discussion of specific issues 
that make visible the connections between consequences and individuals or 
groups that are affected by them. Such an approach requires us to renounce 
both terms of the opposition between a universality and a particularity 
equally conceived as being a priori, in order to conceive universality (or the 
global community – the Great Society) as the outcome, rather as the input of 
the political process of the quest for legitimacy. Pragmatism asks us to give up 
both the conception of a universal and neutral public sphere and that of a 
plurality of identitarian spheres statically defined by pre-determined traits 
(culture, gender, race, geographical proximity, language, religion).  
This conception revolutionize not only the political notion of public sphere 
but also the epistemological notion of public reason: constitution through 
inquiry and not representation through justification defines the proper core of 
public reason. In so doing, pragmatism takes us also beyond the competing 
conceptions of rationality as a) a rational (Rawls), arguing (Elster) or 
communicative (Habermas) form of discourse and b) as a negotiating, 
                                                 
1 I tackle extensively with this issue in Frega 2009a and Frega 2011 (Forthcoming) 
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bargaining, instrumental or pragmatic competition for the adjudication of 
scarce resources. Public reason is irreducible to both conceptions, as it denotes 
a collectively undertaken process of inquiry in which interests, aims, visions 
and identities are constantly negotiated through the participation in a 
common effort at revising the system of our partly shared and partly diverging 
beliefs, and where also the scope of this common interest varies according to 
the different kind of public that are mobilized by different issues. Reasons as 
well as interests, values, and political aims are the tentative and fallible 
outcomes of the political process itself. Through public inquiry, interests and 
aims are neither merely pursued nor simply justified: they are first of all 
constructed through the deliberative confrontation carried on according to the 
epistemological paradigm of inquiry. It is therefore to inquiry and 
deliberation, not to aggregation and negotiation that we should rely in order to 
reach this aim. This is the most concrete consequence of the epistemological 
shift from a classical to a pragmatist account of rationality based upon the 
acknowledgment of the epistemological primacy of practice (for a detailed 
account see Frega 2006a and Frega 2006b).  
 
2. Pragmatist public reason: the main categories 
 
A first glance at trends in contemporary debates shows that the advancement 
of mainstream philosophy and of the social sciences in the last decades has 
often been reached at the cost of a progressively impoverished and reduced 
conception of what is human reason, what its tasks, what its outcomes2. Critics 
of this tendency have pointed out that this has produced an increasingly 
narrower understanding of the main features of human agency: if we conceive 
wrongly the nature and scope of human reason, we are likely to arrive at 
strong misconceptions concerning deeply important facets of human 
experience. This is a topic that pragmatism has long entertained in its calling 
for a renewed understanding of philosophy and the social sciences both in their 
professional identity and in their social function. Although pragmatism has 
traditionally advocated the idea of a unitary conception of reason based on the 
idea of inquiry, an updated account of rationality as a common feature of 
human agency is still missing.  
Critics of traditional epistemology like Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Stanley Cavell, Michael Sandel, Bruno Latour and Michael Walzer join neo-
                                                 
2 Critical remarks along these lines can be found in the work of many contemporary 
philosophers. An account of contemporary anglo-american philosophy along these lines is 
offered in Frega 2009a. For a critique of the instrumental paradigm of rationality from a 
pragmatist perspective see Frega 2006b. See also, from a different perspective, Richardson 
1994 and Richardson 2002. 
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pragmatists in the acknowledgment that moral and political theory have been 
dominated by an understanding of human agency which is based on a 
inadequate account of rationality. As a confirmation of this trend in moral and 
political epistemology, we should only consider the justificatory turn that has 
characterized the mainstream Anglo-Saxon political philosophy with the 
increasing focus on topics of justification, consensus, and truth3. This recent 
turn is, from a pragmatist perspective, the evident symptom of a broader 
problem: the tendency towards an understanding of human experience (and of 
the role of intelligence inside it) dominated by an hyper rational and idealistic 
conception of human reason as detached from its generative and functional 
roots in real practices. Defenders of this approach have often answered critics 
claiming that outside the safe harbour of such a reason we are exposed to the 
uncertainty and risk of disagreement, conflict, violence and that, in short, we 
are obliged to chose between a normatively strong conception of reason and 
the arbitrary rule of power or the irrational play of instincts and sentiments4.  
The pragmatist concept of public reason is built upon the refusal of this 
presupposition; the re-location of rationality into the proper field of its exercise 
– human agency and practices – opens a different understanding of basic facts 
concerning the functions of reason, its mode of operation, its outcomes and 
scopes, and its criteria of validity. In order to accomplish this task, 
pragmatisms proposed to conceive the notion of public reason as being part of 
a broader framework of naturalistic epistemology (Frega 2009b). Such an 
account deploys a conception of rational inquiry as human activity embedded 
in experience (principle of continuity) and functionally oriented to the 
development of experience itself (immanence of reason to agency and practice) 
through the examination of contested issues in problematic situations. 
According to such an account, rational inquiry is conceived as an activity 
whose main function is the guide of conduct through the fixation of beliefs5. 
Accordingly, human agents are said to be rational as long as their interactions 
with their environment are guided by a reflective attitude characterized by the 
fact that obstacles are perceived and faced as problems.  
Rationality can be considered as an attribute of agency only as long as the 
notion of agency is in turn defined through the overcoming of the duality of 
thinking and action towards the idea of a ‘reflective behaviour’ that is 
common to the whole pragmatist tradition. On these general basis, inquiry 
becomes the general paradigm of human rationality. Here I would like to recall 
the traits of this conception which are more relevant for defining public reason. 
                                                 
3 See as examples the Volume 5, Issue 1, 2008 of the journal Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology, or Gaus 1996. 
4 An issue clearly dominating the tradition that connects the classical liberal sources of 
Hobbes and Locke to contemporary liberal scholars. For a survey, cf. Gaus 2003. 
5 For classical statement on this issue, see notably Dewey 1922 (MW 14). 
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According to this perspective, an agent is rational if a) he bases his conduct on 
accepted beliefs as long as those are not currently put into question (primacy 
of practice); b) he adopts inquiry (and not authority nor other means) as the 
method for fixing the beliefs that governs his present and future conduct 
(inquiry as paradigm of thinking) and c) he considers beliefs as instruments for 
the control of agency that are revisable in principle (fallibilism) and whose 
meaning is defined with reference to the consequences derived by acting upon 
them. These traits point towards an understanding of rationality as a public 
and open enterprise.  
Rooted in a contextual situation, driven by the needs of practice, 
implemented through specific forms of activity and dependent upon the 
intersubjective scrutiny of other fellow inquirers and agents, the exercise of 
rationality is inescapably public, both in its theoretical and its practical use. 
The pragmatist approach to public reason is built upon this basic assumption. 
In order to articulate a pragmatist theory of public reason, it is therefore 
necessary to qualify the term ‘public’ with reference to this more general 
awareness of publicity as an irreducible trait of all expressions of human 
rationality. This task will be accomplished starting from an examination of 
Dewey’s conception of the ‘Public’. I will then proceed to draw some broader 
implications for a pragmatist conception of public reason. 
According to pragmatist epistemology publicity is a general trait of 
rationality. Notably, publicity enters the pragmatist conception of rationality 
in at least four senses: 
1. Rationality is directed to the control of consequences of actions. Therefore, its 
use is public in the sense of taking place in the open field of phenomena that 
affect a plurality of agents. 
2. Rationality is a trait of human agency (the deweyan “reflective behaviour”). 
Therefore, it is public in the sense of being the observable attribute of open 
activity. 
3. Rationality is experimental as, after the scientific revolution, it is 
characterized by accessibility of results, transparency of methodologies, and 
repeatability of experiences by a plurality of inquirers. 
4. Rationality is shaped by the social and cultural matrix that constitutes human 
experience, and therefore possesses traits which are indexed to its socio-
cultural context of origin. 
This epistemological framework implies that inquiry is intrinsically public 
in all its expressions. Therefore, if we want to give a specific meaning to the 
term ‘public reason’, in a way compatible with the meaning that has become 
popular in political philosophy, we should add a further specification to our 
initial definition of what qualifies the public nature of rationality. In order to 
do this, we have to specify in which sense, from a pragmatist perspective, this 
politically public dimension has to be taken into account. As I will try to show, 
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the specificity of the public use of reason is determined by reference to a sub 
set of the category of consequences.  
This idea can be found in Dewey’ s conception of public, as this last is 
defined through the concept of consequences. This connection is pivotal for the 
definition of a pragmatist conception of public reason as I conceive it6. This is 
the first condition that defines the public use of reason in political terms: 
rationality should be put under the requirement that where a plurality of 
agents is engaged, the general assumption that each action produces 
consequences has implications which cannot be dealt with merely by those 
that are directly implicated. If a public domain is generated by the mere fact 
of intersubjective consequences, public reason denotes a particular way of 
dealing with these consequences. More precisely, the idea of public sphere is 
related to consequences of agency as they are considered not merely in terms of 
their natural effects (in modifying the environment) nor of their epistemic 
implications (in view of the production of knowledge), but of their experiential 
impact (on the life conditions of other human beings). Dewey remarks that 
“human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences 
are perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control 
action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others” (LW 2: 2437). Here 
the third sentence introduces a theme which is crucial for a pragmatist account 
of rationality: that of the control of action and, through it, of consequences. 
The next element introduced by Dewey is crucial for the definition of a public 
sphere as opposed to a private one, and is therefore the central piece of a 
pragmatist understanding of the attribute ‘public’ as it is used in political 
theory.  
Dewey writes that “consequences are of two kinds, those which affect the 
persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others 
beyond those immediately concerned” (LW 2: 243). The concept of public 
refers only to those consequences (intended or unintended) that affect people 
beyond those directly involved in the action considered8. More explicitly: 
                                                 
6 Bohman 2007 discusses in a partially similar way the political implications of the 
pragmatist passage from a politics of demos to a politics of publics. For different approaches 
see notably Talisse (this volume), Misak 2000, MacGilvray 2004. 
7 Dewey’s works are cited according to the complete edition of his work as EW (Early 
works), MW (Middle works), and LW (Later works) followed by volume and page numbers. 
Complete references for each work cited are provided in the Bibliography. 
8 “The essence of the consequences which call a public into being is the fact that they 
expand beyond those directly engaged in producing them” (LW 2: 252); “The public 
consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an 
extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for” 
(LW 2: 246). Further on: “the public itself, being unable to forecast and estimate all 
consequences, establishes certain dikes and channels so that actions are confined within 
prescribed limits, and insofar have moderately predictable consequences” (LW 12: 268). 
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“transactions between singular persons and groups bring a public into being 
when their indirect consequences – their effects beyond those immediately 
engaged in them – are of importance” (LW 2: 275). The criteria invoked for 
defining what should be considered important are: “the far-reaching character 
of consequences, whether in space or time; their settled, uniform and recurrent 
nature, and their irreparableness” (ibid.). In a way that has recently gained 
increasing consensus, Dewey pioneered an issue-centred approach to politics9.  
This reference to the dimension of consequences is used by Dewey in order 
to define the notion of publicity, which, according to the perspective here 
outlined, is strictly related to that of the public10: “there can be no public 
without full publicity in respect to all consequences which concern it” (LW 2: 
239), as well as – I would add – in respect to the ways followed in order to 
produce evidence about them. So conceived, public is a dynamic notion in two 
senses, that the pragmatist epistemology of practice helps us to explore. First 
of all, public coalesce and gather according to the varying needs of situations: 
each of us belongs to different publics according to the different order of 
consequences that affect our lives11. Secondly, the public is the outcome of the 
reflective process of inquiry aimed at the identification of the consequences, 
not the pre-existing subject of the inquiry itself. It is precisely the effort at 
identifying and articulating problems that reinforces the constitution of the 
public. Inquiry, in this sense, is not a cognitive action of the public, but the 
activity through which the public discovers itself. 
Therefore, the identification of a public sphere depends upon the following 
conditions: a) human actions produce consequences; b) these consequences 
affect also individuals which are not directly involved in the action itself; c) 
such consequences need to be managed in order to secure some effects and 
avoid others; d) the acknowledgment of these consequences is a proper 
function of the exercise of public reason, and e) the public so defined is not 
considered as a pre-existing collective entity but as the outcome of a process 
                                                 
9 See Marres 2005, which explicitly relates issue-based approaches in contemporary STS 
research on politics to Dewey’s theory of the public; for an issue-centred conception of the 
global governance, see Rischard 2002: 171 ff., cit. in Held 2004. 
10 Public and publicity should be kept strictly distinguished, although they are strongly 
related. It would be useful here to remark the similarities and differences with other notions 
of publicity, e.g. the arendtian one. If the idea of a strong correlation between public reason 
and full accessibility is generally acknowledged, Dewey’s originality lays in the fact that 
publicity’s constraint is considered as an attribute of consequences and not of decisions 
(power) or discussion (discourse). 
11 I disagree with MacAfee’s interpretation of Dewey’s notion of public as cannot being 
plural (MacAfee 2008: ch. 6). As I will show, publics are not plural merely according to a 
multicultural perspective; they are structurally plural because the world we inhabit is 
organized according to multilayered and evolving systems of consequences which affect the 
constructions of collective identities and, therefore, of publics. 
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aimed at producing a shared response to the developed awareness of being 
commonly affected by the consequences of certain facts. 
If the pragmatist conception of rationality can be defined through the idea 
of the intelligent control of action and of its consequences (the fixation of belief 
being the main medium), the idea of a specifically public form of rationality is, 
accordingly, defined with reference to a specific subset of consequences: those 
that affect people not directly involved in the action and therefore not in the 
position to partake directly in the positive control of those consequences. The 
public does not denote, then, neither a specific political entity (e.g. state, 
government, representative bodies, etc.), nor a given set of reasons (universal 
principles, neutral reasons, etc.) nor a distinctive sphere of individuals 
involved in specific forms of agency (the officers, the readers, the bourgeois, 
the voters, the rational agents, etc.), but a specific set of effects induced by 
actions performed by agents, be they individuals or groups.  
The implication of this approach is threefold. Firstly, the focus on 
consequences rather than on causes and principles determines a shift of 
democratic theory from a general quest for justificatory consensus to the 
search for solutions to specific problems. Secondly, the traditional democratic 
conception of publics as territorially based homogeneous communities (shaped 
according to the state-model of citizenship) is overcome towards an issue-based 
conception of publics as being dynamical, and shifting. A fact, this last, that in 
recent decades has been identified as an important cause of democratic 
deficits12. Democratic deficits occur precisely when the community of those 
engaged in a given issue fails to overlap with the political community that has 
the legitimate power to decide, and no alternative forms of devising solutions 
are found13. Thirdly, the identification of the public with effects of actions 
rather then with specific institutions implies a turning away from the idea that 
the task of political philosophy is the justification of given institutions14 
towards a transformative conception of political theory and practice as 
oriented towards the regulation in the formation and resolution of specific 
issues. The task of political theory becomes that of experimentally devising 
solutions to problems related to the consequences determined by private and 
public actions15. As Dewey notes, in political theories that do not acknowledge 
this fact , “reason comes into play only to find justification for the opinion 
which has been adopted, instead of to analyze human behaviour with respect 
                                                 
12 Marres 2005, Nahuis 2009, and Hamlett 2003. 
13 See Held 2004 for the notion of a multilevel citizenship, and Bohman 2007 for a similar 
pluralization of the concept of demos. 
14 An approach that has dominated the liberal debate of the last three decades and that 
have come to be identified, following Gerald Gaus, as “justificatory liberalism”. 
15 In Dewey’s words, “the formation of states must be an experimental process” (LW 2: 
256). 
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to its consequences and to frame polities accordingly” (LW 2: 249). This turn 
might be defined as a passage from a justificatory to a transformative conception 
of rationality. 
Shift from consensus to issues, conception of rationality as inquiry, 
pluralization of publics and focus on transformative processes are four 
important traits which characterize a pragmatist conception of public reason. 
So defined, the public denotes necessarily a dynamic entity: it is not identified 
once and for all by some substantive traits (the belonging to a racial, linguistic, 
cultural, geographical or political community) but is functionally defined in 
terms of who is effectively involved by the consequences of a certain type of 
action. Therefore, we have to consider it not as the pre-given subject16 of a 
claim but as the outcome of a quest. This conception has not only a political but 
also an epistemological meaning: it is the cornerstone of the pragmatist 
approach to justification and consensus. In this perspective, the State (using 
this expression to identify all kinds of governmental and representative 
institutions) is only a specific category of public, characterized by the presence 
of “official representatives to care for the interests of the public” (LW 2: 259). 
Therefore, “the public forms a state only by and through officials and their 
acts” (LW 2: 277).  
This dynamic conception of the notion of public has a further consequence 
which concerns the role played by inquiry in its transformative constitution: 
as the public does not denote a mere collection of individuals identified from 
outside but a self-aware community, then public reason is composed by at 
least two dimensions: an objective dimension concerning the events that 
produce consequences which affect agents (exploitation of youngster in work, 
pollution of a given area, racial/religious/gender discrimination, etc.); a 
subjective dimension concerning the shared awareness that a plurality of 
individuals are affected by the same consequences. Inquiry shall therefore 
have a crucial role in identifying new publics not only through the theoretical 
study of how consequences (direct or indirect, intended or unintended) affect a 
plurality of individuals but also through the practical work of rising 
awareness, in order to make consequences to be perceived. Therefore, the idea 
of public reason that emerges from Dewey’s writings is considerably different 
from that which dominates current debates in political philosophy, not only 
because of its larger extension, but also because of its deeper context-
dependence. In a pragmatist’s perspective, we are confronted with a public use 
of reason whenever both of the two following conditions are satisfied: 
1. a public is objectively and subjectively identified (reference to the shared 
and perceived nature of consequences); 
                                                 




2. problems that concern it are faced through the use of rational means (resort 
to inquiry in order to face the problematic situation).  
Dewey adds two further conditions, intended as criteria for determining the 
degree of democracy of an institution trying to organize a public. From the 
perspective of the individuals belonging to the public, a democratic public is 
one that grants to each individual “a responsible share according to capacity in 
forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in 
participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain” (LW 2: 
328). On the side of the aggregate, a group is a democratic public if it is able to 
free “the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests 
and goods which are common” (ibid.)17. It should be noted that in a pragmatist 
perspective consequences (and not rights or other intrinsic properties of 
individuals) are the explaining factor in the use of public reason. Accordingly, 
values and other conceptual entities (e.g. principles) are defined with reference 
to their function in the organisation of experience rather than as pre-defined 
criteria of assessment. This has huge implications on philosophical issues like 
those of legitimacy and justification: notably, it puts into question the very 
idea that the task of philosophy should consist in providing justifications (or 
foundations) for existing institutions, ideals or norms. A task that continues to 
exhaust the energies of a great part of political philosophers. 
 
3. Contemporary varieties of Public Reason 
 
In order to better grasp the distinctive traits of the pragmatist account of 
public reason sketched so far, I will compare it with three of the most 
important conceptions of public reason that are found in contemporary 
political theory: a) the classical liberal conception of the public as the space of 
shared reasonable beliefs; b) the discursive conception of the public as an 
enlarged sphere characterized by the kind of rationality displayed by the 
rational use of discourse; c) the critical theory account of public reason as the 
political answer to conditions of oppression. 
 
3.1 Liberal public reason and the dualism of the public and the private  
 
In the liberal tradition, epistemic conditions of validity for public rationality 
are defined through the opposition of the public to the private use of reason (a 
conception to be found in the liberal tradition from Hobbes and Locke to 
                                                 
17 Both conditions have recently been taken into serious consideration by theories of 
deliberative democracy. For an account which considers these two dimensions, see Dryzek 
2000, Niemeyer 2002, Niemeyer-Dryzek 2007. 
What Pragmatism means by Public Reason 
 
 39
day18). Most part of the liberal tradition shares the idea that public use of 
reason is legitimate as long as it respects certain requirements which guarantee 
its impartiality. It is the idea of publicity that dominates the liberal tradition 
and which has become of central importance especially since the work of John 
Rawls. This idea stems certainly from the long-lasting commitment of 
liberalism to the autonomy of the self. But it is also rooted in a strong 
epistemological conception of human reason as divided into a private and a 
public realm. At the heart of this distinction lies the intuition that, while the 
use of reason in its private form is selfishly subjected to individual drives and 
therefore liable to producing conflict and disagreement, access to its public use 
enables a universal understanding on which only it is possible to ground our 
associated life.  
The idea of such a dualism is already present in the philosophical work of 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and spans all the liberal tradition19. Here I 
will briefly present it with reference to its recent formulation by John Rawls. 
In Rawls’ philosophy, the dualism of the private and the public is formulated 
as an opposition between the rational and the reasonable, this last standing for 
the public use of reason and the rational for its private use. Rawls defines 
private reason through the paradigm of instrumental rationality as “a 
conception of rational advantage of each participant, what they, as 
individuals, try to claim”. Private reason is defined as the ability to pursue 
with efficacy an end whatever it is20, while public reason is identified by the 
capacity to reason from a common standpoint, whose function is to free the 
individual from his particular perspective in order to identify the collective 
aim worth of being pursued. Private reason can be altruistic (whenever the 
interest I pursue is the wellbeing of another person) but cannot be 
intersubjective21. Public reason, or reasonableness, is then introduced in order 
to provide a suitable epistemic basis to a particular form of reasoning that 
takes place when interaction aims at instituting fair terms of cooperation. This 
requires two conditions: a) the willingness “to propose principles and standards 
as fair terms of cooperation” and b) the readiness “to abide by them willingly, 
given the assurance that others will likewise do so” (Rawls 1993: 49). 
Intersubjectivity is then defined in terms of reciprocity: the human reason 
                                                 
18 For a complete account, see Gaus 2003. For a critical appraisal, see Frega 2007. 
19 The criticism of the dualism of the private and the public that I am advancing on 
pragmatist grounds is mainly epistemological: its focus is not the public/private divide as 
such – as is the case for example in critical theory – but the specific understanding of 
rationality that is presupposed by liberal epistemology and on which liberal political 
philosophy is built. For a more extensive treatment, see Frega 2009a: ch. 2. 
20 In Rawls’ words: “the rational … applies to a single, unified agent … with the powers of 
judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own” Rawls 1993: 50. 
21 “The reasonable, in contrast with the rational, addresses the public world of others” 
(Rawls 1993: 62). 
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attains its public functioning whenever it operates on grounds that all agents 
can accept.  
We can grasp the strong continuity in liberal thinking in the persuasion 
that human rationality has an intrinsically asocial nature expressed by its 
private use (a use that, as Rawls observes, aims not only at identifying the 
most efficacious means for given ends, but also at choosing among competing 
ends). In order to overcome their deep disagreements, human agents must 
therefore give up their private reasons and engage in a different way of 
thinking characterized by the fact that they appeal only to reasons that are 
considered to be shared by all (reasons that nobody could reasonably be 
expected to reject, in the classical liberal wording). As Rawls remarks, the 
meaning of the concept of public as referred to reason is threefold22 (Rawls 
1993: 213). 
− Its subject is the public: it is constituted by the ensemble of beliefs that are 
shared by all citizens (in virtue of being those beliefs that no individual could 
reasonably reject); 
− Its object is the common good: it aims at defining the basic structure of a 
democratic society; 
− Its content is public: it consists of those assumptions that are implicit in the 
political culture of a democratic society and therefore assumed to be shared by 
all (under the presupposition of reciprocity). 
Public reason, therefore, speaks with a universal voice and addresses 
common problems starting from shared assumptions and referring to shared 
criteria of assessment (a theme that accompanies Rawl’s thinking from the 
Theory of Justice to the following political liberalism and to his later revisions 
of the idea of public reason23). Justification, in fact, “is addressed to others 
that disagree with us, and therefore it must always proceed from some 
consensus, that is from premises that we and others recognize as true” (Rawls 
1985: 229). Public reason identifies the ensemble of shared beliefs that 
constitute the common framework for taking public decisions, according to a 
deductive paradigm of rationality. As John Dryzek has remarked, “public 
reason is a set of commitments that individuals must adopt before they enter 
the public arena, not what they will be induced to discover once they are 
there” (Dryzek 2000: 15).  
As can be seen even from this short sketch, pragmatism and liberalism are 
grounded on two radically different epistemologies; refusal of the dualism of 
the private and the public and willingness to conceive public reason as a 
deliberative arena where shared conclusion and not already given premises 
                                                 
22 I would say that properly speaking the criteria are only two, as the first and second 
criteria can be reduce to one, the second depending clearly on the first. 
23 I offer a reconstruction of this theme in Frega 2009a. 
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identifies the public content of our common rationality, are the main traits 
that separate the pragmatist notion of public reason from its liberal 
competitor. 
 
3.2 Publicity as the attribute of the discursive sphere 
 
A different account of the public dimension of reason is offered by Jürgen 
Habermas, notably in his groundbreaking work on the origin of the modern 
public sphere. His speaking of a public sphere rather than of a public reason is 
quite revelatory of the fact that he is proposing a rather different idea of what 
constitute the public character of reason. The most relevant innovation 
introduced by the notion of a public sphere concerns the acknowledgment that 
beliefs about public life have an inescapably dynamic nature: the public sphere 
is conceived not as the institutional arena where competing individual interests 
find a compositional order but as the social sphere where individual beliefs 
concerning the public dimension of life are constantly formed and unformed. 
Habermas includes in his account of public rationality a strongly 
transformative perspective that brings him close to the pragmatist tradition 
well before his later more explicitly pragmatist turn. The process of belief-
formation gets primacy over the process of belief-justification.  
This transformative stance is couched in linguistic terms, as the public 
sphere is mainly conceived as being discursive: it is a realm of discourses 
oriented towards agreement. Public opinion, than, more than public reason, 
seems to be the adequate category for grasping the content of Habermas 
understanding. The public sphere, in fact, as Nancy Fraser puts it, “designates 
a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk” (Fraser 1992: 110). Rationality is in this way 
separated from agency in order to be characterized only as an attribute of 
discourses: it denotes discourses which are shaped in accordance with some 
given procedural constraints24. A second relevant difference with the liberal 
account is the broader range of contexts to which public reason can be applied. 
According to Habermas, in fact, the public use of reason is not confined into 
the formal context of institutional practice only (governmental, parliamentary 
and judicial) but extends over to what he calls the informal public sphere. This 
broadening is so evident and the recognition of the importance of the informal 
public sphere so great that it could even be possible to conceive the public 
sphere as being external and somehow opposite to the state (see Fraser 1992).  
                                                 
24 This exclusively discursive definition of the public sphere can be found also at the bottom 
of new concepts such as those of “transnational public sphere” or “global public sphere”, 
which focus precisely on the new discursive arena made possible by the development of new 
media technologies (mainly web based) and which are therefore of a purely discursive 
nature. See Bohman 2007, Olesen 2005, Fraser 2007 and Stichweh 2003. 
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Nevertheless, Habermas shares with Rawls the idea that in order to rise 
from the private to the public use of reason25 – a mark, indeed, of the dualism 
of reason they both accept – a sort of moral supplement is required: the 
injection of an ethical drive (Habermas speaks of solidarity, Rawls of 
reciprocity) is seen as the necessary condition for contrasting the insufficiency 
of a reason that, because of its private character, has no legitimacy where 
public issues are at hand. Not differently from Rawls, Habermas sees public 
reason as requiring that private reasoners refrain from exercising their reasons 
in their own private interest. Only in that way rational discourse can attain 
this legitimacy which is required in order to ground public decisions and 
institutions. While in Rawls the egoism of private rationality is neutralized 
through the fiction of the veil of ignorance freeing each agent of his individual 
traits, in Habermas this same moralizing function is accomplished by 
procedural rules that inform and orient communicative public discourse.  
Habermas’ discourse centred democratic theory grounds democratic 
legitimacy in the institutionalization of procedures of public discussion and 
reasoning that are consistent with those discursive standards of rationality 
that he has discovered as the normative grounds of all discourses oriented 
toward communication. These are necessary procedural presuppositions of 
rational argument and their respect constitutes the main requisite for a use of 
reason that can deliver legitimate pretences. In this perspective, the public 
sphere is conceived as a space of dialogue among citizens in which every speech 
is governed by the ultimate telos of arriving at a form of agreement. Habermas’ 
model of public reason as communicative is centred on a purely linguistic 
understanding of rationality as the practice of exchanging reasons with the aim 
of producing consensus among people – and so assuring the coordination of 
social action – through reciprocal understanding (instead of, say, coercion). As 
it was the case with Rawls and more broadly with the classical liberal 
tradition, this communicative use of reason has to be understood through its 
opposition to a different conception of rationality, that Habermas, referring to 
the sociological tradition, calls strategic or instrumental and which is defined 
through its lack of reference to the intersubjective dimension of the 
coordination of social action. It is, in short, another avatar of the private vs. 
public dualism. The Habermasian approach to public reason is characterized 
by a focus on the procedural content of rationality: it identifies a list of 
criteria26 that should be respected in order to ensure that discussion is oriented 
                                                 
25 “Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond the 
institutional threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, 
ministries and administrations”, Habermas (2002: 9). 
26 It is not by chance, then, that those who have attempted to develop empirical tools for 
measuring the degree of rationality of practical deliberation have turned towards Habermas 
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towards communication rather then towards persuasion and that will enable to 
distinguish a discourse conducted according to normative requirement – and so 
being able to claim legitimacy - from a discourse that is not.  
While familiarity of Habermas with pragmatism has often been noted, his 
kantian-based epistemology puts him nevertheless at odds with the central 
tenets of a practice-based pragmatist epistemology27. With reference to the 
notion of public reason, it is notably the priority accorded to the linguistic 
dimension and the acceptance of the dualism of public and private reason that 
contribute mainly to differentiate Habermas’ thinking from a pragmatist 
account.  
 
3.3 Public reason, critical theory, and the critique of actually existing democracies 
 
There is a third contemporary conception of public reason worth examining, 
which is shared by a wide range of political thinkers which spans from post-
modernism to feminist thinking to subaltern studies via critical discourse 
theory. This wide array of conceptions is unified by an agonistic understanding 
of the public sphere as a political arena where reason and discourses are but 
some of the forces engaged in the task of shaping collective agency, and where 
power (and its unmasking) becomes the primary focus of philosophical 
scrutiny. Many of these thinkers acknowledge a deep indebtedness to 
Habermas (and some also to pragmatism) and tend to privilege discourse over 
rationality, and power over reason as the main explicative category of political 
theory. One of the most relevant achievements of this approach is an 
enlargement of the boundaries of the public sphere28, associated though with a 
remarkable restriction of the prerogatives of reason inside it.  
The main reason for this restriction has to be found in the fact that 
traditional universalistic models of rationality are criticised on a political 
rather then epistemological basis. Public reason is, in fact, generally criticised 
not on the ground of some epistemological argument (as is the case with 
pragmatism) but according to the political argument that in its universal guise 
it operates as an instrument of oppression: while claiming to speak with a 
universal voice, it unduly generalizes a particular perspective (gender, class, 
race) at the expense of others and, in so doing, it masks real differences and 
sustains forms of exploitation. While in Rawls and Habermas public reason is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in order to find a theoretical framework for their enterprise. Cf. especially Steenberger et al. 
2003. 
27 I will not discuss here the more pragmatically oriented turn that characterizes his writing 
since the de-trascendentalizing move accomplished in the mid-nineties (see notably 
Habermas 1999). My focus is not a complete assessment of Habermas philosophy but rather 
to highlight the main differences between two competing paradigms in moral and political 
epistemology. 
28 See Fraser’s critical remarks of in Fraser (1992: 110). 
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the most authentic expression of human rationality, in critical thinking it 
becomes the avatar of power and the instrument of exploitation and exclusion. 
In this perspective, broadening the very notion of reason has a direct political 
implication: it aims at giving voice to all those instances that have been kept 
silent under the fiction of a universal public reason speaking with a single and 
universal voice.  
The important key to critical theory is that its countermove is enacted in 
the same presupposition of habermasian discourse theory, i.e. a definition of 
reason through the notion of discourse: if rationality is discursive, than 
discourses can be claimed to be either the instrument of universal 
emancipation or of particular forms of domination. Speaking rationally, and 
rationality as the attribute of a mode of linguistic expression, become therefore 
the focus of debate, as it can be seen in many of the critiques that have 
addressed the rational/logic form of expression as being merely a form of 
distinction29 aimed at enforcing exploitation of western, bourgeois, white, 
adult, male over one or the other minority group. If we, therefore, look at the 
parable going from rawlsian political liberalism to critical theory, passing 
through discourse theory, we notice an inverse relation between the width of 
the public sphere and the place assigned to reason in public affairs: while 
rawlsian public reason was remarkably restricted only to political essentials 
but Olympic in its epistemological power (in the most classical sense), critical 
theorists accomplish such a broadening of the notion of public reason that 
many of the practices that it now encompasses can hardly be called rational or 
be considered as genuine expressions of rationality30.  
The broadening of the public sphere enacted by this heterogeneous group of 
scholars is realized along multiple and differentiated strategies: through the 
pluralization of the forms of expression that are considered to be legitimate in 
the public arena (pluralization of expressive forms), of the kind of discourses 
that are admitted in the public arena (pluralization of discourses) and of the 
forums where people meet and which are considered part of the public sphere 
(pluralization of spheres). According to the first strategy, expressive forms such 
as greetings, visual communication, personal narratives, etc. should be given 
full citizenship in the public arena, as they express the voice of subaltern and 
exploited groups, while communicative rationality is said to express the voice 
of dominant bourgeoisie (Fraser 1992, Young 2000, esp. ch. 2) According to the 
                                                 
29 In Bourdieu’s sense. 
30 Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (Mouffe 2000, Laclau-Mouffe 1985) provide a clear 
example of how the refusal of the classical model of rationality issues in an antirationalistic 
approach that opposes language games to argumentative foundation (Mouffe 2000: 11-12). 
Pragmatist public reason, as we have seen, is similarly critical of classical model of 
foundational rationality, but leaves much broader prerogatives to the use of reason in 
politics and justification. 
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second approach, public reason has to be broadened in order to include 
“artistic methods, arts of communication and arts of living, philosophical 
reflection, and therapeutic and educational methods” (Neubert 2008: 103-104), 
as these are legitimate discursive forms that shape public agency. Finally, 
according to the third, the habermasian preference for a single universal 
bourgeois public sphere should be given up in order to let flourish a plurality of 
subaltern counterpublics where counterdiscourses are produced and circulated 
in order to affirm different and contrasting interpretations aimed at shaping 
identities (Fraser 1992).  
In all these approaches, the refusal of the neutral or universal subject 
which follows the acknowledgment of the inescapability of identitary traits in 
rational discourses is obtained through the dismissal of some of the central 
epistemic requirements implicit in the notion of public reason. Rationality is 
then progressively deprived of some of its distinguishing traits: equating 
reason with other forms of utterance, or rational inquiry with other forms of 
discourse, or reducing public discourse to its role in shaping identity, we miss 
some distinctive traits which are nevertheless necessary if we whish to account 
for the role rationality plays in shaping and guiding not only private but also 
public agency and life.  
The consequence is a twofold contextualisation of rationality. Firstly, as 
the subject of reason is always a specific group speaking from a situated and 
specific perspective (and never from a universal or neutral point of view). 
Therefore, discourse is considered to be public precisely as long as it keeps track 
of its situatedness, and not as long as it removes it. Secondly, as the content of 
public reason (reasons in Rawlsian terms) tends to be widened: far from 
restraining its content to neutral reasons to be used within the institutional 
debate, it covers all beliefs and forms of expression which circulate in the 
multiple forums where political issues are debated, according to a model which, 
like the deweyan, is problem driven. Therefore, the outcome of public reason is 
not adjudication according to uncontroversial universal principles, but local 
decisions which take into consideration contextual factors. As a consequence, a 
public is not identified by the set of beliefs, institutions, or principles their 
members share, but by their acknowledgment of sharing an interest or a 
problem that touches upon the lives of a plurality of individuals.  
These approaches are right in denouncing the distortions generated by the 
idealizing model of reason that philosophers such as Rawls and Habermas 
have introduced in the political discourse. They are right, too, in 
acknowledging that agents access the public sphere not as disembodied 
rational agents but as bearers of an individual and social identity that shapes 
(and hinders) their participation to public life. In this perspective, a viable 
account of public reason has to take into consideration how social, cultural, 
political, and economical practices are intertwined with rational discourse. But 
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the acknowledgment of the irreducibly practical nature of human reason, of its 
being a distinctive trait of human agency, cannot be adequately maintained 
unless we acknowledge also the specific traits that rationality brings to agency. 
In order to do this, we need to fix some clear limits to the pluralization of 
reason advocated by these theorists. Only in this way, in fact, we will be able 
to preserve the epistemic requirements which are needed if we whish to 
maintain a consistent notion of rationality. To this extent, critical thinking 
often lacks the required epistemological resources.  
Acknowledging the proper place of reason in the public sphere and 
explaining how rationality can both be public and keep its relationship with 
the agent’s identities requires that we drop the universal project of classical 
liberalism while at the same time that we avoid to collapse reason with 
discourses or other expressive forms. It is to this extent that a new and 
different epistemology is required, if we whish to find new keys to understand 
the place of rationality in human agency. The key to this new understanding 
of public reason can be found in the priority of practice over discourses and in 
the acknowledgment that the reference to agency and practices does not 
destitute the powers of reason but rather provides the conditions for a more 
adequate understanding of human rationality.  
 
4. Public inquiry and the pragmatist concept of public reason 
 
As I have tried to show, the contemporary scene of political philosophy shows 
three main conceptions of public reason. According to the first, public reason 
denotes those beliefs which can be granted universal assent and, for this 
reason, can ground forms of reasoning that have intersubjective normative 
value. According to the second, public reason receives its normative force by 
the endorsement of some procedural traits which guarantee that outcomes are 
not driven by selfish interests but by genuine commitment to the public good. 
According to the third, public legitimacy belongs to any form of expression 
which is used in the political affirmation of a collective claim (identity, need, 
right) provided it is not driven by violence but by the search for 
understanding.  
Pragmatism offers a different account of public reason and, as a 
consequence, of the notion and functioning of the public sphere. A first 
important consequence of the pragmatist notion of rationality as here defined 
is that it overcomes the dualism of the public and the private in order to adopt 
a reflexive conception of rationality based on the self-correcting nature of 
practice. A second innovation concerns the different scope assigned to reason. 
While the liberal and discursive traditions assigns to reason the theoretical 
function of identifying common rules or beliefs that should be adopted by all 
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citizens in their public deliberations, pragmatism sees reason as rather issue 
oriented and problem driven. Both the classical liberal and the habermasian 
perspectives conceive the scope of reason in terms of providing justification to 
given theoretical beliefs or existing institutions, rather then in terms of the 
practical dimension of joint action. The idea of citizens engaged in a coercion-
free discussion aimed at producing a justification for given institutions, 
compared to the pragmatist idea of a process of inquiry aimed at identifying 
and solving specific problems shows the difference between the exclusive 
consideration of the discursive or linguistic dimension typical of liberalism and 
the account of the full import of human practices in the normative functioning 
of public reason. While the liberal tradition locates public reason in the 
methodological context of the pluralism of beliefs and the conflicts to which 
they are subjected since the modern era, pragmatism locates public reason in 
the context of concrete and pluralistic practices, focusing its use on the 
assessment of consequences determined by the fact of associate living. In so 
doing, pragmatism relocates public reason on the ground of practice.  
A further aspect of the difference between these two accounts can be seen 
in the different appreciation of a common theme, i.e. the introduction at the 
heart of the concept of reason of a reflective element. But while in Habermas 
the reflexivity stands for the critical attitude of reason in questioning its own 
presuppositions, in pragmatism the reflexivity expresses a more complex 
relationship between the individual, the situation and the experimentally 
public nature of inquiry. In Habermas the idea of a public sphere is tightly 
connected with a discursive understanding of rationality. The use of reason, in 
its instrumental and especially in its communicative dimension, is mainly seen 
as the practice of exchanging reasons. The public sphere is certainly enlarged 
compared to the rawlsian notion, but it extends to the broader society only as 
far as society develops forms of communication and discussions that respect 
certain discursive criteria. The development of a public sphere is then 
connected with the diffusion of this discursive practice. In this perspective, the 
public is the place where discourses are exchanged and were people debate 
political issues in a form that is submitted to certain procedural rules, the first 
of which is the publicity made possible by the spread of the press. In critical 
theory, these limitations of the liberal tradition are clearly identified and 
overcome. The dualism of the public and the private is fully criticised; 
unfortunately, this is done on a political rather than on an epistemological 
basis. Still in line with the pragmatist approach, the classical foundational 
project is generally replaced with a more contextualized project of critique of 
actually existing democracies whose aim is transformative rather then 
foundational. Unfortunately, these positive aspects are generally accompanied 
by a too fast dismissal of the prerogatives of rationality in human agency, 
private and public. The appeal to the principle of difference, to the right of 
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expression and inclusion and to the hermeneutical paradigm of understanding 
are, in fact, inadequate in order to provide a full account of public reason. The 
ensuing idea of public reason, as a consequence, lacks the epistemological 
resources that are necessary for enabling it to address questions of legitimacy 
and of normative validity. 
Critical theory thinkers have criticised classical liberal paradigms of public 
reason for relying on a too formal model of rationality, which has exclusionary 
consequences that democratic theory should avoid. Pragmatism shares this 
critique but fears that this critical stance might underscore some 
epistemological requirements that should be preserved in order to shape 
policies according to goals and resorting to means that can best support the 
flourishing of a society. Pragmatism shares this critique and joins critical 
theory in claiming that the use of public reason cannot depend upon the 
sharing of some universal beliefs or principle, nor on the adoption of some 
conceptual framework a priori considered to be shared by all. The 
inescapability of the fact of pluralism, of the inhibitory effects of oppression, of 
the fragmentation of identities imply that traditional conceptions of 
rationality such as those of Rawls and Habermas are not adequate for 
providing a normative account of how rationality should guide political 
practice. But the solution, according to pragmatism, does not reside in 
substituting rationality with expressive and rhetorical forms of expression, nor 
inquiry with communication, discourses and narrative, but rather in 
developing a conception of rationality capable of taking into account the 
experiential conditions in which public reason operates. Communication and 
narrative are certainly powerful resources at play in public spaces, but their 
role should not be confused with that of rationality, and notably should not be 
overestimated in the domain of justificatory practices. 
Pragmatism assigns this task to the theory of inquiry. The idea of political 
inquiry as a collaborative practice aimed at solving problems emerging in the 
course of associated life offers the preliminary basis for a pragmatist theory of 
public reason. In this article I have showed that pragmatism can be seen as 
offering a theory of public reason which rivals with the most influent 
contemporary approaches. More empirically oriented work will have to show 
the extent to which this alternative paradigm will help us in dealing with 
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